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Until the remarkable events of 1989, international relations in general, and European security in
particular, were defined by the relationship of the Soviet Union to the United States.  This was a
relationship of increasingly controlled enmity, but enmity nonetheless.  Given the centrality of
this relationship, it is hardly surprising that the creation of a new international order, and of a
new security system in Europe, has focussed on the place Russia is to occupy.  At present, the
most important site of this redefinition of the relationship between Russia and the rest of Europe
is the enlargement of NATO.  As three Rand Corporation analysts wrote in advocating NATO’s
enlargement, “this will require the West to decide what role it really wants Russia to play in
European political, economic, and security affairs.  The Alliance needs to make some hard
choices about where and what it wants to
talk about with Moscow.”1  The answer that
the West seems to have provided is that it
wants to talk to Moscow in the NATO-
Russia Permanent Joint Council — a body
in which the now-expanding Alliance will
meet as a collective with Russia, both in
regular sessions and in times of ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency.’2
The Permanent Joint Council, and the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation
and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation” of which it forms a part, are the result
of years of often tense negotiation between NATO and Russia over Russia’s opposition to the
enlargement of the Alliance.  The enlargement of NATO has met with widespread opposition
throughout the Russian state and political elites.  The various nationalist parties, particularly
those represented within the Duma, have been outspoken in their opposition to NATO’s
inclusion of former Warsaw Treaty Organisation states.  The Yeltsin Administration had been
essentially unswerving in its opposition, even when offered the terms which were finally agreed
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in the Founding Act.  Barely a month before signing the Act in May 1997, Yeltsin appeared to be
trying to block enlargement with his endorsement of a reunion with Belarus.  Even having signed
the Founding Act, Russia reiterated its opposition on the day enlargement was formally decided,
with Russia’s Foreign Minister greeting the decision by saying that: “We still consider expansion
the biggest mistake in Europe since the Second World War.”3
In the face of this opposition, and given the importance of Russia to the reformation of
international security, why has NATO proceeded with enlargement?  On what grounds has the
process been justified?  Why, in the oft-quoted words of the American President, was the
question of NATO enlargement not ‘whether’ but ‘when and how’?4  As part of the process
leading to expansion, NATO released an extensive “Study on NATO Enlargement,” which set
out the goals that the Alliance hoped to achieve though admitting new members:
3. Therefore, enlargement will contribute to enhanced stability and security for all
countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by:
- Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and
democratic control over the military; [Emphasis added.]5
NATO’s own answer to the question of ‘why enlarge?’ is therefore in order to promote stability
and security, by means of transforming the states of Central and Eastern Europe into democratic,
European states.  The argument that NATO can provide democratic stability to the states of East
and Central Europe has wide currency among the foreign policy elite of the United States.6  For
convenience, I will label this argument, promoted by the decision-makers and accepted by the
majority of academic commentators, the ‘Promote Stability’ path to enlargement.7 ‘Promote
Stability’ conceives of NATO as an inward-looking organisation, promoting democratic politics
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and market economics among its members.  NATO enlargement will produce stability by
extending the Euro-Atlantic ‘security community’, in the language Democratic Peace theorists
have borrowed from Karl Deutsch.8  While most of the advocates of this view of NATO
recognise that the Alliance is still a military alliance, and might be called on to provide collective
defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, this feature of NATO is subordinated to the
promotion of political and economic stability.
There is, however, a second argument for expanding NATO, which we can label as
‘Strategic Response.’9  As one of the few commentators to argue in favour of this position puts
it: “the Alliance should expand to strengthen the West’s political and strategic position in Europe
at a time when Russia is unable to prevent it.  NATO would then be better placed to meet a
resurgent Russia in the future.”10  Zbignew Brzezinski has pointed to the danger of basing
NATO’s enlargement on ‘Strategic Response’ justifications in an intervention which has been
cited repeatedly in the debates over NATO’s future:
In expanding NATO, one should note that neither the alliance nor its prospective
new members are facing any imminent threat.  Talk of a ‘new Yalta’ or of a
Russian military threat is not justified, either by actual circumstances or even by
worst-case scenarios for the near future.  The expansion of NATO should,
therefore, not be driven by whipping up anti-Russian hysteria that could
eventually become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  NATO's expansion should not be
seen as directed against any particular state, but as part of a historically
constructive process of shaping a secure, stable, and more truly European
Europe. [Emphasis added.]11
For advocates of expansion, then, the process should not be seen to be directed at Russia, and so
take great pains to avoid suggesting that it is.  For example, consider the labels ‘Promote
Stability’ and ‘Strategic Response,’ which I have borrowed from an article advocating
enlargement.  The authors called ‘Promote Stability’ and ‘Strategic Response’ alternative ‘paths’
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to enlargement, in order to maintain a clear rhetorical break between the two justifications by
suggesting that only one path could be taken.12
The relationship between ‘Promoting Stability’ and providing ‘Strategic Response’ is
important for my purposes in this paper, but not as alternative explanations for, or even
justifications of, NATO enlargement.  I am not interested here in how we might explain NATO
enlargement, either in general or in the particular process which has emerged.  Nor am I
interested in explaining why it is that Russia is to be excluded from NATO, or why Russia has
been opposed to the enlargement process.  Rather, my questions concern the relationship
between Russia and a NATO which expands for whatever reasons.  In particular, I want to ask
questions of the meaning of NATO expansion, about what sort of Europe an expanded NATO
will serve to form, and about what place Russia can have in such a Europe.  Ultimately, then, I
want to ask questions about the identity of Russia which is being made possible by the practice
of NATO enlargement.  ‘Promote Stability’ and ‘Strategic Response’ are important because they
seem to suggest two very different identities for NATO, and therefore for Russia.
The first path, ‘Promote Stability,’ suggests that NATO has become an institution for the
political and economic development of its members, which happens to have a collective defence
capability.  It suggests that security, in the NATO context, now means the creation and
maintenance of democratic polities and market economies.  On the other hand, the second path
suggests that NATO is still primarily a means to collective defence, and that security in the
NATO context means the defence of its members against external, military threats.  The
relationship of Russia to these two institutions is likely to be very different, and so to answer the
question of the place of Russia in a Europe with an enlarged NATO, it is essential to determine
which NATO it is that is enlarging.  It is only when we know something about the identity of an
enlarged NATO — an institution of ‘stability promotion’ or one of ‘strategic response’ — that
we can know what Russian Other will be alongside the enlarged NATO Self.  Therefore, to
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know the identity of Russia that is being forged in NATO enlargement, it is essential to
understand the nature of security practices within the enlarging NATO.  In order to show why
this is so, and to show how I will investigate the answers, I first explore the idea of identity
formation, of the creation of Self and Other, in more detail.
Constituting Identity and Difference
I began this discussion with a quotation speaking of the West needing to “decide what role it
really wants Russia to play in European political, economic, and security affairs.”  This phrasing
is rather jarring, coming as it does in the midst of fundamentally realist analyses of European
security.  Most of the discussions of NATO enlargement, and certainly most of the rest of these
authors’ texts, are firmly committed to a traditional conception of both states and security.13 
Arguments are marshalled with reference to objectively knowable interests; Russia’s future
behaviour is most often discussed in terms of ‘geopolitics’; and arguments about possibilities are
couched in the language of varying distributions of power — most notably the present
‘weakness’ of Russia.  To talk of ‘the West’ deciding what role Russia will play in a new
security order echoes a very different language of international relations.  It raises the possibility
of thinking about enlargement not in terms of strategy and stability, but rather in terms of
identity — and, of course, difference.  As David Campbell writes:
Identity is an inescapable dimension of being.  No body could be without it. 
Inescapable as it is, identity — whether personal or collective — is not fixed by
nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior.  Rather, identity is
constituted in relation to difference.  But neither is difference fixed by nature,
given by God, or planned by intentional behavior.  Difference is constituted in
relation to identity.  The problematic of identity/difference contained, therefore,
no foundations which are prior to, or outside of, its operation.  Whether we are
talking of ‘the body’ or ‘the state’, or particular bodies and states, the identity of
each is performatively constituted.  Moreover, the constitution of identity is
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achieved through the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an
‘inside’ from an ‘outside’, a ‘self’ from an ‘other’, a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign’.
[Emphasis added.]14
In other words, actors in international relations — states such as the United States or Russia, as
well as collectivities of states, such as NATO — constitute in their (inter)actions identities in
relation to one another.  While the implications of this argument run much deeper than the ‘role
Russia (or NATO, for that matter) is to play’ in European politics, such role construction is a key
part of the performative constitution of identity.  The resonance of the last line I quoted from
Campbell with the practice of NATO enlargement is striking, for what else is NATO doing if not
inscribing boundaries which serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’, a ‘Self’ from an
‘Other’?  I am saying rather more here than that NATO expansion will demarcate a new line in
Europe, dividing those covered by the Article 5 guarantee from those not — as important as that
line undeniably is.  The decision over admission criteria is very much an act of identity
construction — creating the limits within which ‘members’ must fit in order to be ‘inside’, in
order to be defined as ‘Self’ in the NATO context, rather than ‘Other’.15
By engaging in practices, international actors performatively constitute themselves and
the others with whom they engage.  NATO enlargement, as one such practice, can therefore be
considered in terms of the identity it constitutes for the NATO Self.  But as Campbell reminds
us, identity is known only in relation to difference; the Self is known only in relation to the
Other.  Therefore, NATO enlargement can also be considered in terms of the identity it is
constituting for the non-NATO Other.  Given the exclusion of Russia from the enlarged NATO,
and the history of the relationship between NATO and the Soviet Union, we can thus think about
NATO enlargement in terms of the reshaping of Russia as the Other to the NATO Self.  The
question of what sort of Self-Other relationship that will be is the central question of this article.
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The constitution of identities/differences in the practices of NATO during the Cold War
has been most extensively recounted by Bradley Klein, who reveals the manner in which NATO
military strategy and practice was intimately connected to the construction of a particular NATO
Self and Russian/Soviet Other:
The important point here is not that the Soviet threat is or is not a mythic
construct, but that the creation and perpetuation of NATO required a particular
representation of Soviet strategy.  The imaginative construction of the Soviet
threat as a constitutive dimension of the Cold War cannot be chalked up to false
consciousness or deliberate deception on the part of policy makers . . . In this
sense, when it comes to NATO, the external referent of the Soviet threat begins to
pale in importance to the concerns expressed by strategists themselves regarding
the need to construct certainty about life at home.16
Klein’s argument is that the pursuit of a particular form of ‘security’ in and through NATO
constituted both the Soviet Union as a threat to the West, and at least as importantly, it
constituted ‘the West’ which was to be secured.  It is important to recognise that the practices
used to ‘secure’ the West were inseparable from the creation of that Western Self and of ‘the
East’ as its Other.  In a very real sense, the construction of identity and difference in the Cold
War NATO was part and parcel of NATO’s ‘security’ practices.  It is for this reason that we
must inquire into the nature of NATO’s security practices as it enlarges in order to know what
identity enlarging NATO will construct for itself and its Other.
Judith Butler provides a way of thinking about the kinds of questions I am asking, about
the constitution of Self and Other in practice, in the course of her attempt to explore the way
speech constitutes subjectivity and agency:
Consider the situation in which one is named without knowing that one is named,
which is, after all, the condition of all of us at the beginning and even, sometimes,
prior to the beginning.  The name constitutes one socially, but one may well
imagine oneself in ways that are quite to the contrary of how one is socially
constituted; one may, as it were, meet the socially constituted self by surprise,
with alarm or pleasure, even with shock.  And such an encounter underscores the
way in which the name wields a linguistic power of constitution in ways that are
indifferent to the one who bears the name.  One need not know about or register a
way of being constituted for that constitution to work in an efficacious way.  For
the measure of that constitution is not to be found in a reflexive appropriation of
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that constitution, but, rather, in a chain of signification that exceeds the circuit of
self-knowledge.17
The NATO practice of enlargement is ‘naming’ Russia in a particular way, forming for Russia a
particular social location which will shape the future identity of Russia whether Russia
appropriates the identity or not.  As Butler notes: “Because I have been called something, I have
been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but
perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes.  The terms by which we are
hailed are rarely the ones we choose . . .”18
In the rest of this essay, I conduct a reading of a series of NATO documents in order to
reveal the meanings and practices of security which are encoded in them, and to see how they
will serve to ‘name’ both NATO and Russia.  While individual documents tend to be static,
series of documents agreed in the same institutional setting can reveal transformations in shared
meanings.  Thus, changes in the language of the collective expressions of NATO, as reflected in
the documents discussed below, are indicative of changes to the intersubjective meanings
constitutive of NATO.  The documents are an important source of these meanings, as the
documentary record of an institution is openly used as a ‘collective memory’ of that institution. 
These collective memory records allow institutions to engage in reflexive self-monitoring, a
practice crucial to the construction of stable social agency.19  In the next section I consider two
Cold War texts to show how the intersubjective understandings of security and the Soviet Union
are revealed in these documents.  I then conduct an extended reading of a series of NATO texts
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dating from 1989 up to and including the 1995 “Study on NATO Enlargement”, looking for
changes in their constitutive understandings, in order to determine, first, the nature of the NATO
Self, and then the Russian Other which may come from enlarging the Alliance.
Constitutive Meanings in the Cold War
Both the nature of security and the role of the Soviet Union in the practices of NATO in the Cold
War are well accepted.  ‘Security’ involved the protection of members of the Alliance from an
external military attack, principally by means of deterrence but also by defence if necessary and
by threat reduction if possible.  Bradley Klein has shown the intimate relationship between that
security and the particular Western identity that NATO secured.  On the other hand, the Soviet
Union was the principal source of potential military threat.  In the terms developed above, the
role the Soviet Union played was that of the potential enemy, in a military confrontation
focussed on — though not restricted to — the inter-European divide.20  The question I am asking
here is how were these meanings reflected in the documentary record of the Alliance?  If I can
identify the language used to signify this understanding of the heart of the Cold War security
organisation of Europe, it should be possible to analyse the ways in which this language has
changed since the end of the 1980s in order to reveal the alterations in the understandings of
security and of the role of the Soviet Union/Russia in the practices of the NATO alliance.
The most important reflection on the nature and practices of the Alliance, following its
founding and before the changes of the late 1980s, was the Harmel Report of 1967.  This report
has served ever since as an authoritative statement within NATO on the nature of the Alliance.21 
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nature of the Alliance.  By way of just one example, a book published in 1990, which reflected on NATO’s
past and looked to its future as it turned forty, was able to state: “There is broad consensus in Western Europe
that this strategy, first articulated in the Harmel Report of 1967, remains the most appropriate foundation for
allied security policies.”  Stephen Flanagan and Keith Dunn, “NATO’s Fifth Decade: Renewal or Midlife
Crisis”, in Keith Dunn and Stephen Flanagan (eds.), NATO in the 5th Decade (Washington, DC: National
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It is therefore an ideal basis for an investigation of the documentary memory of the Alliance, and
so I will read the Harmel Report for the way in which it indicates these key intersubjective
meanings, and then briefly show that these meanings had not changed immediately prior to the
end of the Cold War.22
Security
In §5, the report sets out the heart of the Alliance, and in doing so addresses the two questions
which are my focus: how was security understood, and what role did the Soviet Union occupy in
NATO’s understandings of security practice?
5. The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to maintain
adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other
forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression
should occur. Since its inception, the Alliance has successfully fulfilled this task.
But the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the central political
issues in Europe, first and foremost the German Question, remain unsolved.
Moreover, the situation of instability and uncertainty still precludes a balanced
reduction of military forces. Under these conditions, the Allies will maintain as
necessary a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby
creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.
In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the
search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying
political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of detente are not
contradictory but complementary. Collective defense is a stabilizing factor in
world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards
a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in
particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of detente. The
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participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement
of the political problems of Europe.23
The use of the term ‘security’ in this paragraph is revealing.  In the first instance, it is ‘military
capability’ assuring ‘the balance of force’ which creates ‘security’ (as well as stability and
confidence).  The second instance reinforces the fundamentally military character of security in
the NATO context by clearly separating ‘military security’ and a ‘policy of detente’. 
Unsurprisingly, in fact, the Harmel Report is quite open and explicit in stating the military,
confrontational nature of security which is commonly accepted to characterise security in the
Cold War.
Given the stress that is placed on fostering democratic institutions and market economies
in the discussion of enlargement, it is worth asking how these ideas are treated in the Harmel
Report.  The quick answer is that they are not.  The closest that the text comes in §5 is the
mention of ‘political solidarity’, but this is seen as contributory to deterrence and defence.  It is
not particularly surprising that NATO did not go further than this in discussing democratic
institutions, given the variation of domestic constitutions among NATO members in the Cold
War.  Nevertheless, as Klein has argued, there is a deep connection between NATO’s military
security and the forging of political solidarity in the face of that variability:
The genius of NATO as a security alliance was the way in which its particularly
modern accounts of development and security were enframed within a widely
legitimate strategic discourse of deterrence.  By effectively wedding itself to
defense of a distinctly modern, Western, Atlantocentric project, strategic
discourse enabled strategists to deflect criticism of the Alliance’s extraordinary
internal contradictions as a mechanism for deterrence and Western military
defense . . .  Until proven wrong by the outbreak of [a major international] war,
NATO’s strategy was thus the only feasible means of securing that precarious
historical construct called ‘the Western way of life.’24
In the Cold War NATO, military security served to produce political solidarity (‘the Western
way of life’), a solidarity which then contributed to deterrence.  Such a relationship between
security, liberal democracy and market economics — assuming that the latter two constitute the
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basis for political solidarity — is very different from the promise of the Study on NATO
Enlargement, in which the creation of common institutions of themselves create security and
stability.
We find in Harmel a fairly explicit acknowledgement of the practical understanding of
security as the protection of members against external attack, to be achieved in the first instance
by military means, but with a political component.  That political component is designed to
create a climate among the potential adversaries that is less than conducive to armed conflict —
in the language of the Harmel Report, dialogue is aimed at creating ‘stability’.  This is crucial, as
it leaves the prevention of, or resistance to, military attack as the unchallenged heart of the
Alliance concept of security.  This understanding is clearly reflected in the official language of
the Alliance on the verge of the collapse of the Cold War security order in Europe.  In June
1987, the North Atlantic Council wrote:
We reaffirm the validity of the complementary principles enunciated in the
Harmel report of 1967. The maintenance of adequate military strength and
Alliance cohesion and solidarity remains an essential basis for our policy of
dialogue and cooperation — a policy which aims to achieve a progressively more
stable and constructive East-West relationship.25
The Soviet Other
The language used to characterise the Soviet Union and its role is less explicit than that which
expresses the common understandings of security among the members of the Alliance.  In a way,
this is unremarkable, for labelling the Soviet Union as ‘the enemy’ in an unambiguous fashion
would be unnecessarily provocative.  Nevertheless, it is not difficult to find markers of the role
which the Soviet Union is seen to occupy in these documents.  For instance, §5 of the Harmel
Report refers to the need for Soviet and American leadership in resolving the underlying political
problems which are the ultimate source of ‘tension’ in Europe.  There are a number of other
instances in the official utterances of NATO in which the Soviet Union is either singled out, or
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referred to together with the United States as occupying a distinct and leading role in key
features of security, notably nuclear arms control.26
The Soviet Union is singled out as the external counterpart to the United States — put
simply, this language recognises the generally acknowledged superpower role of the USSR.  The
particular character of the relationship with the Soviet Union is reflected in other passages of
these two documents.  At §4 of the Harmel Report, for example, NATO writes:
Amongst other developments, the Alliance has played a major part in stopping
Communist expansion in Europe; the USSR has become one of the two world
super powers but the Communist world is no longer monolithic; the Soviet
doctrine of “ peaceful co-existence” has changed the nature of the confrontation
with the West but not the basic problems. [Emphasis added.]27
In 1967, the language of Communist expansion is still used with reference to the USSR, along
with the recognition that the function of the Alliance has been to stop that expansion.  Perhaps
more directly, the emphasised passage speaks of the Soviet Union in confrontation with the
West.  The military nature of this confrontation, and the threat which it poses to the Alliance, are
stated clearly in the North Atlantic Council Communiqué from June 1987:
2.  Serious imbalances in the conventional, chemical and nuclear field, and the
persisting build-up of Soviet military power, continue to preoccupy us. We
reaffirm that there is no alternative, as far as we can foresee, to the Alliance
concept for the prevention of war — the strategy of deterrence, based on an
appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces, each
element being indispensable.  This strategy will continue to rest on the linkage of
free Europe’s security to that of North America since their destinies are
inextricably coupled. Thus the US nuclear commitment, the presence of United
States nuclear forces in Europe and the deployment of Canadian and United
States forces there remain essential. [Emphasis added.]28
This passage is extremely useful in tying together the nature of security and the role of the Soviet
Union: security is achieved through military preparation and is threatened by the Soviet Union. 
Given the importance of US nuclear commitments to this security, the singling out of the US and
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the Soviet Union for a separate practice of nuclear arms control can be seen to reflect the
Soviets’ status as the principal enemy Other in NATO’s understandings of European security.
None of these conclusions are in any way surprising, but they are not intended to be.  The
nature of security in Europe and the role the Soviet Union played in European security during the
Cold War are extremely well known.  What is important is the language used to reflect those
understandings in the official discourse of the Alliance, and its essential continuity between 1967
and 1987.  It is on the basis of this reflection that we can look to the documentary utterances of
NATO since the end of the Cold War and look for altered understandings in the altered language. 
We need to identify changes:
C in the practical understandings of the means of guaranteeing security, in order to
indicate a move away from military security guaranteed by confrontational means.  In the
context of enlargement, we need also to look particularly for practices of guaranteeing
security through building democratic and market institutions.  It is not sufficient to look
for broad declarations of changes in security, but rather we must see evidence of an
alteration in the way NATO expects to act in order to achieve security.
C in language singling out the Soviet Union, its direct juxtaposition to the United States and
the language used to consider its military potential.  We must see, in other words, if
Soviet (and then Russian) military power ‘continues to preoccupy’ NATO.
The first set of markers, those relating to the practical understanding of security, are crucially
important to my arguments.  Ideas of liberal democracy have been central to NATO’s practices
of identity formation since its founding.  These have been the markers of NATO’s identity, the
‘Western way of life’ that NATO is to secure.  The claim of those who see enlargement as
‘Promoting Stability’, which is the position of NATO’s own enlargement study, is qualitatively
different.  Now security is to be provided by democratic institutions.  That very way of life is
promoted as giving unmediated access to security, rather than constituting an uncertain and
threatened object which needs the military might of NATO to be secured.  In order to understand
the way in which Russian identity is being forged in NATO expansion it is, therefore, necessary
to test this claim.
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the strategic concept.  In November 1991, NATO released a new strategic concept, but this was the first time
that the Alliance’s strategy document had been unclassified.
30The North Atlantic Council, “The Alliance’s Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and
Disarmament”, May 30 1989, § 1. The use of the Harmel Report in this later document is an excellent
example of the argument I made above concerning the role of these documents as a ‘memory record’ of an
institution — and also an indicator of the importance of the Harmel Report in particular. In the
Comprehensive Concept, NATO reminds itself of its own fundamental objective — engages in reflexive self-
monitoring — by means of citing and quoting the Harmel Report. The importance of that report is indicated
by its (repeated) role as the authoritative statement of NATO’s fundamental purposes.
31“Comprehensive Concept”, § 64.
Identity and An Enlarged NATO
Security and the NATO Self
On May 30 1989, just before the political transformation of Eastern Europe began, the North
Atlantic Council released “A Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament”,  the
most current public statement of NATO’s security policy.29  The understanding of security that
was to be addressed in the “Comprehensive Concept” is spelled out in the document’s first
paragraph, in a fashion that underlines its fundamental continuity:
1.  The overriding objective of the Alliance is to preserve peace in freedom, to
prevent war, and to establish a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.  The
Allies’ policy to this end was set forth in the Harmel Report of 1967.  It remains
valid.  According to the Report, the North Atlantic Alliance’s “first function is to
maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and
other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if
aggression should occur.” [Emphasis added.]30
The security of the Alliance is thus a military security, guaranteed by confrontation with an
aggressor.  In case the message of continuity was not clear in a simple statement of this
understanding, NATO quoted the 1967 statement of fundamental purpose, and emphasised its
continued validity.  NATO’s new “comprehensive approach to the enhancement of security and
stability”31 is founded on the understanding of security as it was formulated by Harmel.  As far
as the governing body of the Alliance was concerned, there was no real difference between a
condition which would lead to Vaclav Havel becoming President of Czechoslovakia by year’s
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Parliament had adopted a “Resolution on the security of western Europe”, which, at its core, reflected the
same understanding of security as is evidenced by the Comprehensive Concept. See, in particular, European
Parliament, “Resolution on the security of western Europe”, § 6, and compare to Comprehensive Concept,
§ 35. What makes the European Parliament’s expression of this same conception of security in 1989
surprising is that the Parliament has been a voice for changing the institutionality of at least Western security
since it became an elected body ten years earlier.  We might thus expect alternative understandings of security
to find earlier expression here than elsewhere, particularly than within NATO.  Finding almost identical
language describing security in an EP resolution and in NATO’s Comprehensive Concept shows the degree
to which the military, confrontational nature of European security was accepted, throughout Western
European international society, up to the point of the Cold War’s collapse.
33North Atlantic Council, “London Declaration on a Transformed Alliance”, June 1990, § 6.
34The full name of the committee was the Ad Hoc Group on the Review of NATO’s Military Strategy.
The proceedings of the Group are classified, as it was not decided until the end of the process to declassify
the new strategic concept.
35In the Preamble to the “Founding Act”, NATO cites the New Strategic Concept of 1991 as its
guiding strategy document.
end and a condition 22 years earlier which would lead to Soviet troops crushing Alexander
Dubcek’s reforms.32
By the next year, the revolutions in Eastern Europe had run their course.  NATO
recognised that the changes in Europe meant that the Alliance needed to undertake a
fundamental review of the strategy formulated at the time of Harmel.  Its initial response was to
announce, in the “London Declaration on a Transformed Alliance”, that security could be
managed cooperatively, rather than confrontationally.33  In order to effect that promise, NATO
convened a Strategy Review Group, producing a New Strategic Concept which was approved by
the North Atlantic Council in December 1991.34  The understanding of security in this document
is worth examining in some detail, as it is still the principal strategic document of the Alliance. 
In other words, it is the New Strategic Concept of 1991 which will define the strategic practices
of the Alliance even after enlargement.35  It is, therefore, here that we must look to see whether
or not NATO has begun to function as an organisation capable of ‘enhancing stability and
security’ through the creation and maintenance of institutions of democratic government.
At the end of 1990, with the Review process firmly underway, the North Atlantic Council
met and endorsed a statement on security in the new Europe which suggested dramatic change in
NATO’s fundamental understanding of security:
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Having worked to overcome past divisions, our countries must now direct their
efforts to avoiding grave economic disparities becoming the new dividing lines on
the continent.  All countries have the right to exist in security.  In the midst of
change, tendencies towards greater insularity must be resisted.  We seek to spread
the values of freedom and democracy that are at the heart of our transatlantic
partnership so that past labels of East and West no longer have political meaning.
[Emphasis added.]36
This paragraph suggests that security in NATO’s eyes is becoming, by the end of 1990, a much
more expansive concept.  Security is an economic and political concept, much more than a
military one.  The threat to security is characterised as ‘economic disparities’ within Europe —
the fact of economic inequalities is, of itself, a threat to security.  Such a conception of security
derived from peoples’ relative living standards is radically different from the external military
threats of the Cold War era.  These are the sorts of threat which can be combatted by promoting
the institutions of democracy and prosperity.37  In 1990, we therefore seem to have evidence of
the sort of practical understanding of security which it is now claimed will underpin NATO
enlargement.
This holistic conception of security does not survive unscathed into the “New Strategic
Concept”.  The statement of the basic security risks facing the Alliance is found in §10:
10.  Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression
against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of
instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political
difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by
many countries in central and eastern Europe.  The tensions which may result, as
long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and
territorial integrity of members of the Alliance.  They could, however, lead to
crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could
involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having direct effect on
the security of the Alliance. [Emphasis added.]38
While both the December 1990 Communiqué and the December 1991 New Strategic Concept
refer to economic difficulties as the root of potential insecurity, the two documents construct the
nature of this insecurity in very different ways.  In the New Strategic Concept, it is no longer the
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fact of economic disparity which threatens the security of all Europeans, but rather the potential
for violence inherent in economic dislocation which “could involve outside powers or spill over
into NATO countries”.  First of all, the referent object of security in the New Strategic Concept
is once again states (‘powers’ and ‘countries’) rather than all Europeans, in the 1990 document. 
Secondly, while the origin of the threats to security is recognised to have altered, the essentially
military nature of security has been re-established by the end of 1991.
This is not to say that the operative understanding of security within the Alliance is
unchanged by the New Strategic Concept.  The text recognises that the security of the Alliance
used to require a confrontational guarantee against a predetermined opponent, but that now the
means to security are more reactive to an unstable environment.39  More importantly, the
document begins to express the meaning of this shift in operational terms:
But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the
opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are
greater than ever before.  It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the
fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental
elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension.  Managing the diversity
of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security.  This is
reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Alliance security policy:
dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.40
In the context of the current policy of NATO enlargement, what is also noteworthy about this
statement is the continued centrality of collective defence — that is, the “indispensable defence
dimension” of security.  It is true that the defence dimension is no longer unidirectional. 
Forward defence was explicitly renounced by the New Strategic Concept: “This means in
particular . . . that the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear defensive posture in the
central region will no longer be required.”41  Nevertheless, “forward deployment of forces” is
still a possibility, although the subsequent text suggests that this is least likely in the central area,
and much more likely on what were called, in the Cold War, the ‘peripheries’.42  The importance
of this text is the maintenance of a clearly geographical inside/outside divide in the strategic
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43In defending a NATO enlargement which will not provoke Russia, Zbignew Brzezinski writes:
“Since any foreseeable expansion of the alliance is likely to be pacific, the specific military dispositions
arising from the enlarged membership need not involve the forward deployment of NATO troops —
especially American and German forces — on the territory of the new Central European members.”
[Emphasis added.] Brzezinski, “A Plan for Europe”, p. 34.  What is noteworthy about this text is that the use
of ‘forward deployment’ in the context can only mean one thing: that Russia is the ‘front line’.  Moving
troops ‘forward’ still involves moving troops towards Russia.  This is a particularly useful example of how
the practical understandings embedded in the discourse come through.  Expansion is not to be “seen as
directed against any particular state”, but the alliance is itself so ‘directed’ that moving troops towards Russia
is ‘forward basing’.
44North Atlantic Council, “Partnership for Peace: Invitation”, Press Communiqué M-1 (94) 2, 10
January 1994. Consider in particular the following passage, in which I have emphasised the key text:
The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout
Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by
promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that
underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if
that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or
security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual
participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence
budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military
exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as
peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.
[Emphasis added.]
concept.  ‘Forward deployment’ still means locating military forces on the geographical margins
of the Alliance, in order to confront a potential adversary sooner rather than later.  In the context
of an expanded NATO, this means the shifting of a potential front line in the direction of
Russia.43  Thus, while the understanding of security within the Alliance seems to be broadened
by the New Strategic Concept, collective defence maintains pride of place and the front lines are
reinscribed.  It is well worth reiterating that the 1991 Strategic Concept is still the basic strategic
document of the (now expanding) Alliance.
The 1991 Strategic Concept was accompanied by the creation of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC), to which all members of the former WTO were invited.  The
council allowed for a political dialogue with the states of Eastern and Central Europe, including
Russia.  However, in operational terms, the first step towards integrating these states with NATO
came in 1994 with the Partnership for Peace (PfP).  This operational integration is limited
entirely to the military — although in a broad sense, including civilian control and various non-
combat military roles.44  The connection of these collaborative military efforts to security is
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made explicitly in the “Framework Document” which constituted the PfP.  Given the importance
placed above on the way in which security is to be practised within NATO as a way of
evaluating its understanding of the nature of security, the operative articles of this document are
worth examining in detail.  §2 of the Framework Document sets out the nature of security in a
NATO-plus of the PfP, and I have highlighted the key passages:
. . . In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance
and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed
to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and
intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law.  They
reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of
the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing
borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means.  They also reaffirm their
commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to
the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the
field of disarmament and arms control. [Emphasis added.]45
In the first highlighted passage we see reference to democratic societies, so important in the
defence of NATO enlargement.  However, the commitment in the PfP is to the preservation of
these societies, and in particular “their freedom from coercion and intimidation”.  This echoes
Klein’s arguments about the constitutive role of military threats: here again the ‘Western way of
life’ is used to validate military strategy, and thereby constitute that very way of life.  Seen in
another way, democratic constitutions are in some way an entry criterion, but the security to be
provided within the PfP is that of securing those admitted from external threats.  The centrality
of military force in constituting such threats is seen in the second highlighted passage.
The fundamentally military purpose of the PfP is then reinforced in §3, which lists the
specific practices in which the PfP states engage: transparency in defence planning and
budgeting; civilian control of the military; readiness for UN or OSCE Peacekeeping; training for
joint peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations; and, finally, working
towards interoperability.46  This paragraph is particularly revealing, as it demonstrates that the
Mutimer — Making Enemies 22
47“The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)”, NATO Basic Factsheet Number 1, March 1996.
It is important to note that these Factsheets are not agreed texts, and so the specific language of the Factsheet
is not revealing in the same ways the other texts are.  What is important, then, is the forms of practice that
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48Ibid.
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50There are two further areas of practical cooperation within NACC, neither of which refer directly
to ‘security’ in the descriptions of their activities.  The first concerns ‘Information Issues’, which involves
actual practices of security cooperation between Alliance members and the Eastern and Central
European (ECE) states are entirely concerned with the military.  While the confrontational aspect
of the understanding of security in the Cold War Alliance language is conspicuous by its
absence, the lack of any practical measure for security, other than military, is equally striking. 
Taken as a whole, the PfP document seems to reinforce the ‘indispensable defence dimension’ of
security, and NATO’s nearly exclusive focus on this dimension in its practices.
Originally, all forms of collaboration between NATO states and ECE states were
conducted by the NACC, but “[p]ractical defence-related issues, including military cooperation
and exercises, originally incorporated within the NACC Work Plan, have been subsumed into
Partnership for Peace activities.”47  The PfP, therefore, was explicitly designed as a framework
for military cooperation, and so before drawing conclusions about the practical conception of
security within NATO practice, I should examine the practices which are still conducted under
the auspices of the NACC.
There are two broad areas of activity related to security within NACC.  The first is
‘Political Consultation’ and involves “Regular consultations . . . on political and security-related
issues of interest to member states, including regional conflicts.”48  The singling out of ‘regional
conflicts’ is again indicative of the essentially military character of security in the NATO
context, as is the division between ‘political’ and ‘security’ issues.  However, the second area,
‘Economic Issues’, is perhaps even more revealing: “The Economic Committee’s work with
Cooperation Partners focuses on defence budgets and their relationship with the economy;
security aspects of economic developments; and defence conversion issues.”49  Economic issues
in the NACC are seemingly limited explicitly to those concerning the relationship between the
military and the economy.50  What is noticeably lacking in these practices of political and
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technology, science and technology policy.” NACC, Factsheet.
51“New Strategic Concept”, § 10.
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economic collaboration are those designed to foster liberal democratic constitutions and market
economies — except insofar as they involve civilian control of the military and military
spending.  Rather, NATO is building practices of military and defence harmonisation with the
ECE states — in operational terms through the PfP, and in terms of broader political consultation
and defence policy through NACC.
These practices reflect directly the understanding of the relationship between ‘political’
and ‘economic’ issues and security as it is expressed in the New Strategic Concept.51  Economic,
social and political difficulties do not constitute threats to security in their own right, but only
when mediated through the possibility of military violence — and even then they are not matters
of NATO security, “as long as they remain limited” to the territory of those outside the
Alliance.52  In the context of enlargement, this means that NATO security may now be
threatened by instabilities arising from economic and political dislocation in Russia spilling over
the new eastern border of NATO along Russia’s western frontier.
The understanding of security which is encoded in these constitutive documents, and
more importantly in the practices to which they have given rise, can be seen quite clearly still to
be fundamentally military.  For all the recognition of changed security environments, and the
importance of political and economic aspects of security, the practical understandings of security
within NATO reflect the “indispensable defence dimension”.  The practices of incorporation
directed towards the ECE states have been predicated on the primacy of the military, and have
been directed towards military harmonisation across the old East-West divide.  Or, in the words
of NATO’s Strategic Concept: “the new environment does not change the purpose or the security
functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity.”53
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The importance of these arguments for understanding the relationship between an
enlarged NATO and Russia cannot be overstated.  The reading of a benign process of
enlargement assumed by the ‘Promote Stability’ arguments is predicated on the commitment to
enhance security and stability by means of building democratic and market institutions.  To test
that commitment, I suggested that we needed to find expressions within NATO practice which
shifted the guarantees of security away from the military and towards democratic and market
institutions.  This detailed examination of the practices of NATO reveals that such altered
practical understandings of security are not there.  This is not to say that the commitment to
democracy and markets is not real, but rather that it has a different relationship to the practices of
NATO security than ‘Promote Stability’ arguments suggest.  Democratic transformation is not
the direct means to ‘security’ in the new Europe, but is rather the route to the privileged
‘Western way of life’ which is both protected and produced by the practices of military security
within NATO.  The question then raised is what role Russia might have in a European security
structure centred on NATO, and productive of a Western way of life for those inside.
The Russian Other
Through reading closely the documents expressive of NATO’s practical understandings of
security, I have begun to suggest the way that enlargement as a practice will constitute the
identity of the expanded NATO Self.  My ultimate focus is on the Russian identity which is
being forged in this practice, but the two are inseparable.  It is worth recalling David Campbell’s
words: “identity . . . is not fixed by nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior. 
Rather, identity is constituted in relation to difference.  But neither is difference fixed by nature,
given by God, or planned by intentional behavior.  Difference is constituted in relation to
identity.”54  Therefore, understanding the NATO Self as it is produced and reproduced in and
through enlargement takes us a long way toward knowing the Other.  However, before drawing
conclusions about the Other, and particularly about Russia as that Other, I must read those same
constitutive documents for what they have to tell of Russia’s place.
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Russia’s location in the understandings and practices of the new and expanding NATO is
not so clearly read from the texts and their practical manifestations as is the understanding of
security.  Nevertheless, there are some tendencies which do need to be drawn out.  The first of
these emerges in the treatment of the changes in the Soviet Union in comparison to those in the
other ECE states in NATO’s Strategic Concept.  Two paragraphs are particularly relevant:
11.  In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that
accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that its
conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European State
and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States. 
These capabilities have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe
are to be preserved . . .
14.  From the point of view of Alliance strategy, these different risks have to be
seen in different ways.  Even in a non-adversarial and co-operative relationship,
Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension,
still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take
account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe. The end of East-West
confrontation has, however, greatly reduced the risk of major conflict in Europe.55
The first point to notice is that it seems Soviet military capability still preoccupies the Alliance
in 1991.  Clearly, much has changed since the Strategic Concept was released, including the
demise of the Soviet Union.56  The degree of change, and of continuity, in NATO’s
understanding of the present security environment is reflected in the Study on NATO
Enlargement:
In 1991, the Strategic Concept stated, “The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale
attack on all of NATO’s European fronts has effectively been removed . . .” Since
then, the risk of a re-emergent large-scale military threat has further declined. 
Nevertheless, risks to European security remain, which are multi-faceted and
multi-directional and thus hard to predict and assess.  NATO must be capable of
responding to such risks and new challenges as they develop if stability in Europe
and the security of its members, old and new, are to be preserved. [Emphasis
added.]57
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While this language might suggest a recognition that the Strategic Concept is outmoded, in fact it
almost precisely reproduces the earlier text.  First of all, the passage explicitly quotes the
Strategic Concept.  More to the point, most of the rest of the passage, while not enclosed in
quotation marks, is also a direct quotation.  I have  emphasised the words lifted directly from the
earlier document.58
The second point to be raised about the treatment of the Soviet Union in the Strategic
Concept is its singularity; that is, the USSR is identified as distinct from all of the other former
Eastern Bloc states.  This is most noticeable in §11, in which NATO speaks of “the particular
case of the Soviet Union”, and tellingly again compares it directly to the United States.  In the
terms I set out earlier, this language reflects no substantive change from that used in the Cold
War documents: the USSR is particularised, it is assessed directly with the United States, and is
done so specifically in the context of its military capability.
The singling out of Russia continues even in the very different context of the Study on
NATO Enlargement.  It is seen first in the general discussion of the present security
environment. Russia is singled out for a unique PfP agreement, and more general cooperation
with the Alliance is discussed in the language of equals — that is the whole of the Alliance and
Russia. The singularity of Russia is seen in even more striking fashion elsewhere in the
Enlargement Study.  Chapter 2, detailing the contribution of enlargement to European security,
comprises three parts: the first on enlargement in the broad context of European security, the
second on its relationship to other security institutions, and the third on relations with Russia!59
While the whole of the section of the Enlargement Study concerned with Russia deserves
careful examination, I will select one key paragraph which reflects the difference between Russia
and any other ECE state, and speaks most directly to the Russian role in European security
following enlargement:
27.  NATO-Russia relations should reflect Russia’s significance in European
security and be based on reciprocity, mutual respect and confidence, no “surprise”
decisions by either side which could affect the interests of the other.  This
relationship can only flourish if it is rooted in strict compliance with international
Mutimer — Making Enemies 27
60Ibid., § 27.
61Ibid., § 24.
62“Founding Act”, Preamble § 1.
63This, of course, is one of the arguments advanced in support of excluding Russia.  It is simply too
large to bring in while NATO is maintained as it has functioned.  While this may well be true, the principal
argument of this paper concerns the effects of maintaining NATO as it has functioned.
commitments and obligations, such as those under the UN Charter, the OSCE,
including the Code of Conduct and the CFE Treaty, and full respect for the
sovereignty of other independent states.  NATO decisions, however, cannot be
subject to any veto or droit de regard by a non-member state, nor can the Alliance
be subordinated to another European security institution.60
Clearly NATO is explicitly abandoning the maintenance of a confrontational stance with Russia,
opting rather for ‘reciprocity, mutual respect and confidence’ (although with the stinging
limitation of the final sentence).  Nevertheless, Russia is placed clearly outside the Alliance —
by virtue of its ‘significance’ in European security.  The origin of that significance is not directly
stated in this paragraph, but it is reasonable to surmise from the rest of the section that it stems
from Russia’s place as “a major European, international and nuclear power.”61
The formal relationship between Russia and NATO following enlargement is established
by the 1997 “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and
the Russian Federation”.  The title itself is enough to support my contention that Russia is being
identified as a singular presence in Europe, comparable to NATO taken as a whole.  This
impression is reinforced in the first paragraph of the Preamble, which begins: “The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member States, on the one hand, and the Russian
Federation, on the other hand . . .”62  Indeed, the whole of the Founding Act establishes the
comparability of Russia, not with the individual members of the Alliance, but with the Alliance
as a collective.  The practices which are established by the Founding Act are practices of
cooperation and consultation between these two equivalent international personalities.  In other
words, the one element of the enlargement process explicitly concerned with defining Russia’s
place in the post-enlargement Europe strongly reinforces the continued singularity of Russia in
issues of European security — and almost necessarily cements its exclusion, for how can a
Russia considered equivalent to NATO as a whole be included within NATO?63
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The constitutive language of the Alliance still singles out Russia, and continues to
juxtapose it to the largest members of NATO or to the Alliance as a whole.  What is more, it
seems still to draw this line on the basis of Russia’s military potential.  Russian military power, it
seems, still preoccupies the Alliance, and leads to Russia’s necessary exclusion.  To complete a
consideration of the Russian role in Europe following enlargement, it is therefore worth asking
what differences there are between being inside and outside.  This question is particularly
important in light of the PfP and NACC practices.  Through these two institutions, NATO has
engaged the ECE states, including Russia, in collaborative military endeavours, aimed at
strengthening European security broadly.  What then is left to differentiate members of the
Alliance from members of NACC and PfP who are not brought into the Alliance?  The answer is
readily apparent, even if apologists for enlargement wish to hide it whenever possible.  The
difference can be shown in any number of ways, but in keeping with the nature of this analysis, I
will begin by comparing two short passages of text.  The first is from the Strategic Concept,
which sets out: “three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; dialogue,
co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.”64  This should be
compared to the title of first statement of the NACC, a month after the Strategic Concept’s
release: “North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement of Dialogue, Partnership and
Cooperation.”65  NACC provides the ECE states with access to two of the three elements of
Allied security policy, dialogue and cooperation, but not the third, the maintenance of a
collective defence capability.
But surely there is more to it than this?  Enlargement is not merely the act of redrawing a
geographical boundary between the Western, NATO Self and the excluded Other, it is also
about reforming the Self inside the NATO container.  Chapter 5 of the “Study on NATO
Enlargement” sets out the requirements of NATO membership in some detail:
70.  Bearing in mind that there is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new
members to join the Alliance, possible new member states will, nevertheless, be
expected to:
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- Conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty: democracy,
individual liberty and the rule of law;
- Accept NATO as a community of like-minded nations joined together for
collective defence and the preservation of peace and security, with each nation
contributing to the security and defence from which all member nations benefit.
[Emphasis added.]66
In order to come within the NATO container of security, the ECE states must form themselves
into an identity with those that are already there.  They must adopt what Klein called ‘the
Western way of life’, take on a Western identity and join the Western Alliance.  As Klein also
makes clear, such an adoption does violence to other ways of life:
[T]he ultimate question forestalled by modern Western strategy has been the one
who or what ‘we’ in ‘the West’ are.  In other words, the politics of strategy has to
do with selecting this or that particular account of human life as dominant. 
Numerous forms of life are ruled out of the picture as inconsistent with the
cultural claims of a singular, modern, progressive industrial order.  There are
many candidates for that liminal space which escapes Western ‘identity’: Gypsies
in Great Britain . . . Balkan guest workers in West German cities . . . Lapp
reindeer herders . . . A whole series of marginal categorizations and boundaries
could be enumerated, and they need not be limited to the ethnographic.  Fractures
of class, gender, and race — of partisan politics and religious identity — all
demark potential sites of contestation with the Western Alliance.  Yet these are
unacknowledged, except as internal threat to the unity and ‘identity’ of the
West.67
Enlargement expands not only the Alliance, but also this process of identification and
marginalisation.  Those in the East must accept this “particular account of human life as
dominant” in order to enter the Alliance; if they choose not to do so, they remain as an
“(external) threat to the unity and ‘identity’ of the West.”
The Study on NATO Enlargement indicates what is entailed by adopting the Western
way of life: it is accepting liberal democratic government and the individual liberty at the heart
of market capitalism — precisely those elements of the enlargement process emphasised by the
proponents of ‘Promote Stability’.  These are also, however, principles endorsed by NATO and
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Russia in the Founding Act.68  Indeed, there is a range of practices taking place outside NATO
enlargement aimed at transforming Russia into a democratic polity with a market economy.  The
IMF has  been responsible for “fostering the implementation of sound macroeconomic policies
and for managing lending operations conditional on the attainment of agreed stabilization
targets.”69  In addition, the World Bank is involved in providing funds for sectoral reform and
infrastructure projects, as well as for structural reforms and improvements in resource allocation. 
The European Union reached a treaty on cooperation with Russia in 1994, explicitly drawing
Russia into the community of Western values.  In addition, it links vital economic cooperation to
the observance of basic political principles.70
Despite these practices, which would appear to be remaking Russia in the Western image,
there has been no move to admit Russia to the Alliance.  There is, therefore, more to joining
NATO than adopting liberal democratic government and market economics; new members also
join ‘a community of like-minded nations joined together for collective defence and the
preservation of peace and security.’  I have demonstrated in this paper the fundamentally
military character of security in the self-understandings of NATO; I cited Klein earlier on the
link between that understanding and practice of security and the formation of a community of
like-minded nations.  This identity community that is NATO was and is forged through the
practice of military security by means of deterrence and defence.  Put another way, ‘Promote
Stability’ and ‘Strategic Response’ turn out to be one and the same thing.  Those that are not
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integrated into the West of NATO, to become part of its Self through taking on the particular
Western way of life which NATO produces, remain outside.
Iver Neumann has provided a way to reconcile the seeming contradiction between
NATO’s practice of constructing Russia as the Other and the rest of the West’s engagement with
Russia.  In an analysis of Russia as Western Europe’s Other over the space of 500 years, he
suggests that Russia is presented throughout this period as “always just having been tamed, civil,
civilised, just having begun to participate in European politics, just having become part of
Europe . . . It is therefore deeply appropriate that, for the last five years, the main metaphor used
in European discussions of Russian politics and economics has been that of transition.”71  The
practices of transition, by this account, can never be completed.72  This argument suggests that
Russia is being reconstituted, once more, as the non-West by which the Western Self is known. 
As Neumann argues:
Danger resides on the borders . . . and so, as long as Russia is constructed as a
border case, it will also be inscribed with danger.  Anne Norton has suggested that
identities are at their most transparent when they are at their most ambiguous, and
that the most rewarding place to study them is, therefore, in their attempted
delineation from what she calls their liminars.  Russia, in whatever territorial
shape, by whatever name, as whatever construction, has a history as Europe's
main liminar. [Emphasis added.]73
The practice of NATO enlargement is identifying Russia in that “liminal space which escapes
Western ‘identity’”74; as the border case on NATO’s outside which is, therefore, a possible threat
and is confronted by an institution predicated on ‘securing’ its inside by military means.
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Conclusion
Bradley Klein has written that:
The end of the Cold War creates an important moment both politically and
analytically . . . But if it turns out that despite the dissolution of the blocs,
strategic practices remain largely intact, then this suggests another character to
the nature of international life.  It may turn out that the interpretive and discursive
resources that animated the Cold War are more persistent and less amenable to
restructuring than celebrants of a new world order might claim.75
By 1990, the members of NATO had recognised the importance of the moment created by the
end of the Cold War, and had begun to reshape Europe as a consequence.  By 1997, the acts of
reshaping have come to be dominated by the move to enlarge NATO by admitting some of the
former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.  On its surface, nothing would seem to
provide greater evidence that there is a true new world order being made in Europe — the old
enemies brought into the central Cold War military institution.  But Klein has sounded an
ominous warning, directing our attention to the practices through which security is to be
achieved.  I have attempted to take that warning seriously and have examined strategic practices
at the heart of the now enlarging NATO to see what ‘interpretive and discursive resources’ will
animate a Europe that is post-enlargement, rather than simply post-Cold War.
Despite a moment of quite startling potential for change, reflected most clearly in
NATO’s December 1990 Communiqué in which the Alliance identified economic disparity as
itself the leading threat to security, the strategic practices of NATO do remain largely intact.  My
reading of the documentary development of NATO from the revolutions of 1989 suggests that
while the practical understanding of security has been altered somewhat, it is ultimately a
relatively minor change.  Security is still military security within NATO, to be defended against
potential violence from the outside.  The promotion of security and stability through democratic
politics and market economics is simply not translated into the practices of NATO for achieving
security.  Rather, there is a reproduction of the Cold War division between military security on
the one hand, and political and economic development on the other.  The liberal, democratic,
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market society of the new Europe contributes to the capabilities of military defence, is the object
of military protection, and is ultimately a product of strategic practices.  It is in this light that we
must judge the inclusion of the former WTO states in NATO, and the identity this practice serves
to create for Russia.
We are used, from the Cold War, to thinking of the enemy-Other as the proponent of an
alternative social system.  Identity and difference were constructed during the Cold War in terms
of forms of governmental and economic organisation.  Therefore, as we see in Russia practices
of economic and political transformation, aimed at producing liberal democracy and a market
economy, we assume that the Other is being made into the Self.  However, there is nothing
essential or eternal about this particular construction of Self and Other — identity and difference
can be constituted on any number of markers.  The present practices of NATO enlargement seem
to be creating a Europe of a ‘stable’ inside and a potentially ‘unstable’ outside, against which a
military, even a nuclear, defence must be maintained.  For all of the practices of engaging and
remaking Russia in the political and economic image of the West, NATO’s enlargement practice
is constituting Russia as part of that potentially unstable outside, denied access to the acme of the
Western way of life.  Russia, in other words, is being constituted as an Other, and as a potential
enemy Other, in the post-Cold War, through the continuation of the strategic/security practices
of the Cold War in NATO.  By enlarging NATO in the terms in which it is being done, by
expanding the Alliance on the basis of an essentially military understanding of security, the West
risks making an enemy of the largest of the European states — again.
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